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The first edition of Paul Taylor's Race: A Philosophical Introduction appeared in 2003, and became a tremendous
success, filling a very important niche in the philosophical literature on race. It drew together different, and
often fractious, philosophical traditions, appealing at different times to 'analytic' and 'continental' figures, as
well as American Pragmatism. It provided a thorough, yet accessible (and often entertaining) survey of the
general contours of philosophical investigations into race and racism that offered rewarding reading for
everyone from experts to undergraduates to those entirely outside of academia. The second edition, which is
the specific focus of this review, attempts to incorporate what have been some very significant developments in
the race-theoretic landscape of the USA (Taylor's explicit focus both for examples and applications of his
theoretical tools). In the preface to the second edition, he points toward three such developments: (1) a
reconsideration of debates in racial ontology in light of what he refers to as the 'unstable détente' it seems to

have reached; (2) an incorporation of recent developments in 'experimental philosophy' and engagements with
Foucault's later work (especially on 'Bio-power') in the discussion of racism; and (3) a 'broadening' of the
engagement with ethics and politics (including the addition of a new chapter) to incorporate issues in
immigration, corrections, and global justice (Taylor 2013: p. xi). Taylor weaves an engagement with these more
recent developments throughout the text, providing new material that will be valuable to the expert and the
novice alike. In this review, I will sketch the general structure and argument of the complete text, focusing my
exegetical efforts on that material new to the second edition.
The first chapter of Taylor's text sets the stage for his philosophical investigation by exploring the language of
race in the specific context of the present-day USA, and thus attempting to pin down what it is that we (those
who occupy that specific context) mean by the concept of race. 'Race-thinking,' Taylor points out, 'has left an
indelible mark on the contemporary world', and so any sincere effort to understand who we are, our place in the
world, and of course the kinds of persons and kind of world we have it in us to create, must come to grips with it
(Taylor 2013: p. 8). Philosophy must, in other words, study the consequences and implications of 'race-talk'
(Taylor 2013: p. 11). Such study should, Taylor argues, entail more than a strictly empirical survey of what
individuals intend in their use of racial terms. Surely such empirical questions, and the 'experimental philosophy'
that takes them as its main focus, are worthwhile lines of inquiry, but Taylor draws a distinction between the
theoretical concept of race, and the 'folk understandings', such that important questions remain about the
advantages and disadvantages of such a concept, and indeed the way in which it might inform or even alter the
folk understanding (Taylor 2013: p. 15). Significantly, he leaves open the possibility that there could be an
egalitarian racialism (a belief in at least some sort of validity for race-talk that does not entail racist hierarchies).
Taylor thus advocates an historically-informed exploration of the development of racial categories and concepts,
and the uses and abuses to which they have been put, in order to address the crucial questions about what
reality, if any, racial terms describe, and the ways in which race-thinking and a commitment to justice and the
good life are or are not possible.
Having made a prima facie case for taking up a philosophical inquiry into race, Taylor takes up three possible
arguments against such a project in the second chapter. The first of these challenges is an ethical one in the
form of a strict advocacy of colour blindness, or in the language of the political movement Taylor uses as his
exemplar of this argument, a kind of racial 'privacy'. If the history of race is inextricably linked to racism, such
that there is no positive use for racial categorisations, then employing such categories, in giving further
legitimacy to pernicious racial (and thus inherently racist) discourse, is necessarily unethical. Taylor's response
here is both to call into question the claim that race is necessarily divisive and pernicious, and that even if this
were the case, it would still be necessary to provide an account of race-thinking in order to proscribe it.
After offering an account of racism (as a kind of disinterest), and an historical overview of the development of
race-thinking from the classical to the modern era (including a new discussion of Michel Foucault's account of
race as a kind of bio-power), Taylor turns to the second challenge, that of the biological invalidity of racial
categories. If so-called races have no basis in biological reality, then the use of scientifically discredited racial
terms to describe human reality is analogous to using discredited medieval concepts to explain the workings of
my computer. Taylor responds by pointing out that the failure of 'classical' (biologically realist) racialism does
not exhaust the possible accounts of race as in some way real, and that the ethical and political projects of antiracism will still require some theoretical analysis of race-thinking in any event. Finally, Taylor takes up the
challenge posed by the view that there are many varieties of human differentiation (class, caste, nation,
ethnicity and gender), and race is often either reducible to one of these categories or at best of secondary
importance. Taylor's response here is subtle and compelling. He treats each contending alternative category
individually and argues that race is both analytically distinct, yet intimately connected to it. Thus, the real claim
here is both that race cannot be 'reduced' to some other category (class being a common contender), and that

any given other category cannot be fully understood in the contemporary context without reference to race
(this he refers to as the 'merger thesis'). Having addressed these arguments against the pursuit of a
philosophical account of race, Taylor takes up the question of the metaphysics of race in the third chapter.
If the term race in Taylor's preceding discussion of race-talk refers to 'a cohort of human individuals whose
bodies and bloodlines are meaningful in ways that mark these individuals off as a set' (Taylor 2013: p. 70), then
the next step is to raise three important questions about the reality of these 'cohorts'. The first question has to
do with whether or not such a concept of race corresponds to or denotes anything that is real, the second asks
whether, if it does correspond to something real, it remains worthwhile to preserve it, and the third question
has to do with what, if it does not correspond to something real, we are doing by employing the concept at all.
Chapter three takes up all three of these ontological questions about race and offers the first significant dose of
material new to the second edition. Indeed, much of this chapter has been significantly refurbished (all of
section 3.3 is new), and readers pressed for time, but familiar with the first edition, would not go far amiss if
they began their reading of the second edition here.
The chapter begins by picking up the historical narrative begun in the second chapter of 'classical' and 'highmodern' racialism, and developing it into the 'late-modern' and 'post-modern' eras. The late-modern era is
marked by the shift away from alleged scientific groundings for racial differentiation and into common sense
and eventually 'cultural' accounts of differentiation (exemplified most strikingly in the US context by the 1965
Moynihan Report). Taylor describes the current post-modern era, meanwhile, as one in which the beneficiaries
of white-supremacist racialism have sought to co-opt resistance (Taylor 2013: p. 76), such that it cloaks or codes
the mechanisms that maintain racial disparities in race-neutral terms, thereby 'rejecting racialism while still
being shaped by it' (Taylor 2013: p. 81). The present-day US context is thus one in which the significance of race
is consistently (and often vociferously) denied, particularly by those who are on the 'winning' end of racial
stratification, yet racial disparities in income, wealth, health, education and so on remain as robust as ever (and
in some cases worse than the pre-civil-rights era). Given this tension between what is, in some sense at least, a
laudable commitment to liberal race-neutral rhetoric and policies on the one hand, and the ongoing racial
differentiation and stratification on the other, the three ontological questions that orient the remainder of this
chapter come into a very clear focus.
After drawing a distinction between racial realists, who believe races exist, and racial skeptics, who do not,
Taylor lays out what he takes to be a kind of consensus on racial ontology reached by philosophical race
theorists, which is new to the second edition, and is informed by some of the most recent literature on the
subject. According to Taylor, the emerging, and tenuous, consensus is one that critically rejects classical
('scientific') racialism, treating races as artifacts of human agency resulting from political, economic, cultural and
material developments of the modern era that is ineluctably social (not a matter of individual choice or whim).
While my own view does in fact differ in some ways from the rough sketch Taylor provides, I agree with him that
it does accurately represent what seems to be the dominant view among philosophers of race, and his succinct
articulation of that view is a very worthwhile contribution to the field.
For the remainder of the chapter, Taylor uses a discussion of 10 questions to lay out his own argument for a
'radical constructionist's' account of racial ontology. For the sake of brevity, I will not detail the individual
questions or his arguments in response to them, but rather focus on laying out Taylor's overall view as it
emerges in the course of the chapter. While he rejects biological realism, Taylor holds that race is ineluctably
linked to the body (indeed, this is part of what distinguishes it from ethnicity), claiming that talking about race,
even though it is a fundamentally social artifact (Taylor 2013: p. 89), 'is to talk about the field of forces and
dynamics that produce and follow from the linkage between body and social location' (Taylor 2013: p. 90). Races
are thus populations, which 'result from sorting processes that can work without the knowledge of the people
who get sorted', as opposed to groups, which are 'collectivefs] in which the members are aware of whatever

binds them together' (Taylor 2013: p. 106). Taylor's argument for the use of race-talk to sort out these
populations is an essentially practical one. As he puts it, 'the claim is that race-talk is well-suited to the task of
noting the ways in which people are already, and really, implicated in schemes of social interaction', and thus,
'we should be willing to say that a person who is properly implicated in certain social relations really is, say, a
white person' (Taylor 2013: p. 111). In short, Taylor's conclusion is that if we want to understand, let alone
struggle effectively against, the social and institutional mechanisms that generate racialised populations and
then (mal)distribute essential social goods among them, race-talk, and thus a viable concept of race as such, is
indispensable.
Having laid out his understanding of the reality of race and put to rest, or at least set aside, some of the more
frequently deployed criticisms, Taylor turns in the fourth chapter to the ethical, practical and existential
consequences of that reality. This chapter is little changed from the first edition and so I will keep my account of
it especially brief. Drawing on a variety of intellectual resources, from W.E.B. Dubois and Frantz Fanon to
Enrique Dussel and Linda Alcoff, Taylor takes up, at an abstract level, the more quotidian questions of identity,
embodiment and experience. Through the course of his explorations of these issues, he takes up his basic
account of race as 'probabilistically defined populations of people whose lives are affected by the operations of
white supremacist institutions' (Taylor 2013: p. 142), and elaborates on some of the practical implications of
that view. Given the significant role race plays in shaping our lives and the conditions in which we articulate and
live out (or up to) our identities, he argues, we cannot adequately understand ourselves or the (social) world
around us without deploying some concept of race.1 Of course, the concept he endorses is a far cry from the
classical/biological one. We must, he argues, take seriously the dialectical essence of identity in a way that
balances the inescapable ways in which the social world conditions our identity, yet still leaves room for the
cultivation and expression of individuality (Taylor 2013: p. 136), such that races are real in a way that shapes
who one is, but does not determine one's identity in any strict sense. Taylor also takes great pains to emphasise
the 'micro-diversity' within given racialised populations. He stresses the diversity within any given community,
yet does not conclude that such diversity means that the populations are in any strong sense illusory or
incoherent. To say that one is of a particular race, in other words, tells one something significant about that
person's social location (and can provide an important avenue of solidarity), but it leaves open a great deal of
room for variation and individuality (and thus need not legislate conformity). Lastly, Taylor makes a compelling
and important case for moving beyond the traditional black/white binary in U.S. racial discourse, such that we
can attend to 'the long histories of collaboration and cooperation between people of every race, histories that
might be encouraging and inspiring in an increasingly cynical and mean-spirited age' (Taylor 2013: p. 152). He
moves throughout this chapter at a brisk and engaging pace, yet still manages to provide a solid introduction to
some very complicated issues within the literature on the philosophy of race.
In the fifth chapter, again one largely unaltered from the first edition, Taylor turns his attention to two very
specific practical/ethical questions: interracial marriage and racial endogamy, and the ideal of liberal colour
blindness and affirmative action. While Taylor had made earlier appeal to the ongoing practice of racial
endogamy as evidence of the continuing social significance of race, in this chapter he focuses on arguments in
support of this ongoing practice. A variety of arguments are examined in this section, and Taylor arrives
ultimately at the conclusion that a duty to endogamy cannot be supported. His discussion of affirmative action
and colourblindness begins by noting what he sees as three basic agreements common to proponents and
opponents of affirmative action in the USA: 'quotas are problematic, outreach and hortatory measures are
important tools in the pursuit of racial justice, and colourblindness is an important ideal' (Taylor 2013: p. 171).
The subsequent discussion of affirmative action covers ground well-trodden by philosophers, and while Taylor
admirably lays out some of the important philosophical considerations, he arrives at the quite reasonable
conclusion that affirmative action, as a focus of discussion, is more of a distraction than a useful or important
debate. It is 'a piecemeal policy, or rather a grab-bag of related policies, none of which attack the roots of racial

inequality in the USA' (Taylor 2013: p. 178). The more significant theoretic point Taylor makes in this chapter has
to do with the way in which analysis of racial policy, in both of the cases he discusses, tends toward a pernicious
individualism. This tendency, he astutely points out, 'encourages us to forget the systematic nature of white
supremacy, the degree to which it was not simply a matter of individual prejudices and slights but an affair of
statecraft', and encourages 'a sort of cultural amnesia: we are, by and large, ahistorical, in ways that allow us to
forget the systematic social engineering that led to current patterns of inequality' (Taylor 2013: p. 176). In other
words, when our analysis of both of his chosen topics in this chapter focus exclusively on individual choices they
are missing the forest for the trees in a way that will ultimately make it more difficult to understand how racism
works and how best to combat it. This is a crucial insight, and one that Taylor delivers forcefully and eloquently.
The presence of a sixth chapter is entirely new to the second edition, and in it Taylor affects a 'doubling down'
on the continuing relevance of race theory in an allegedly 'post-racial' USA primarily by means of an analysis of
debates surrounding issues of immigration policy (Taylor 2013: p. 184). Ultimately, Taylor argues compellingly
that the discourse of post-racialism obfuscates the racial projects that continue to structure our lives, such that
'post-racialism counts as a racial project' (Taylor 2013: p. 185). His argument for this claim begins by making the
case that both the discourse and the policy surrounding immigration, especially immigration by people from
Latin America and Asia, is, despite the lack of openly racialised terminology, still at root a deeply racialised
phenomenon. It is worth noting, Taylor points out, that while the language has shifted from talking about racial
purity and hygiene to one of cultural preservation and the maintenance of 'American'2 values, the 'shape' of the
concerns over immigration on the part of 'natives' remains one in which 'they will swarm over us, take our jobs,
and swamp "our" way of life with theirs' (Taylor 2013: p. 186). This resonance between earlier eighteenth and
nineteenth century 'nativism' and present-day anxieties over 'illegal immigration' plays a crucial role in Taylor's
argument.
Taylor goes on to argue, echoing W.E.B. Dubois, that the immigrants in question (crucially, these are certain
kinds of immigrants from very particular parts of the globe), 'come to inhabit mainstream public discourse not as
people with problems but as problem people, as inassimilable Others who embody the dangers of social and
cultural decline' (Taylor 2013: p. 190). He next invokes Charles Mills' concept of the 'epistemology of ignorance',
which claims that a racist social context legislates a kind of ignorance - a refusal to accept or confront a reality
that challenges the racist framework that has become 'natural' for those (especially, but not exclusively, its
beneficiaries) who inhabit it. Taylor shows that despite all of the hard evidence to the contrary, the threat that
drives this mainstream public discourse is that of 'invented immigrants' who are criminal, lazy and parasitic on
'native' resources, who, within the epistemology of ignorance, serve as dire threats to our way of life (Taylor
2013: p. 193). Key to understanding Taylor's larger argument in this chapter is unpacking the way in which the
first-person plural 'our' functions in this context.
Recall that Taylor had earlier pointed out the similarities between contemporary concerns about 'illegal
immigration' and the nativist ideologies of earlier eras. One significant point about these phenomena is that
they are as much about the victims of these alleged onslaughts as they are about the perpetrators. Given the
common refrain that 'we are a nation of immigrants', which itself elides the continued presence and ongoing
oppression of the truly native populations of North America, it becomes clear that the repeated hand-wringing
about these threatening waves of immigration take the form of a kind of 'ritual' that is as much about
articulating the boundaries of the 'we' as it is about identifying a dangerous 'them' (Taylor 2013: p. 196). As
Taylor makes the point, 'part of what makes a people into a people is the way it tells the story of who and what
it is', and 'the most familiar arguments and ideas about what the USA is... descend from traditions that were
forged in the fires of classical racialism' (Taylor 2013: pp. 195-196). In short, while ignoring evidence to the
contrary within a context (mis)informed by the epistemology of ignorance, the contemporary discourse on
immigration invokes, in a ritual fashion, the tropes and argumentative moves of a nativism steeped in classical

racialism, without itself taking up the language of that classical racialism. Nevertheless, since that discourse
'consists in linking certain forms of physical appearance and lines of ancestry to the prerequisites for citizenship',
it can and should be understood as a kind of racial project, even if such racialism, along with its historical
provenance, are disavowed (Taylor 2013: p. 196). The immigration debates may thus eschew the explicitly
racialised language of earlier forms of nativism, but, as Taylor has argued throughout the book, this is itself a
racialised project designed to co-opt resistance and strengthen the workings of what he has called 'postmodern' racialism. Truly understanding and struggling against this phenomenon thus demands the ongoing
articulation and deployment of a philosophical theory of race.
Taylor's book has many virtues. It covers a wide array of distinct topics and subfields within the philosophy of
race, yet mounts a coherent larger argument about the ongoing significance of race-talk despite the colourblind
pretensions of the 'post-modern' era. The second edition strengthens this overarching argument, while adding
important updates. His discussion of recent developments in the ontology of race, including work in
'experimental philosophy' and the CAMPS consensus that he identifies fill in what would otherwise be serious
gaps in the text. His discussion of immigration policy, meanwhile, shows that Taylor goes beyond merely talking
the talk of transcending the black/white binary, and is willing to walk the proverbial walk. The final chapter not
only engages with up-to-date debates and issues in public policy, but also touches upon the growing
philosophical interest in immigration. All of this is achieved while maintaining an accessible and often
conversational style. To be sure, readers with expertise in any one of the subfields discussed in the book will find
points of contention and even gaps in the exegesis or argumentation, but to complain about that would be to
miss the point of an introduction to the philosophy of race. As such an introduction, this is an exemplary text,
and the second edition deserves to be widely read and adopted in classrooms. Despite its focus on the USA,
there are enough similarities both of history, and of contemporary rhetoric, that the text should be of particular
interest and use within the South African context (and of course a careful exploration of the important
differences between the two contexts would likewise surely prove instructive and rewarding).

Footnote
As we shall see, this informs his later argument that the discourse of 'post-racialism' is actually a surreptitiously
racialised project that misunderstands the social world.

1

To his credit, Taylor is careful, in general, to eschew the term 'American' when describing citizens of the USA.
This is because the term demonstrates a kind of hubris on the part of those citizens, since 'The Americas' really
stretch from Canada, through Cuba, Haiti, and the rest of the Caribbean, through Mexico, Guatemala, and the
rest of Central America, into Bolivia, Argentina, and the rest of South America. For the citizens of the USA to
claim exclusive title to the term 'American'is both badgeography and (to put it mildly) bad manners. That much
of the rest of the world, outside Latin America, indulges us in this self-indulgence by referring to us as
'Americans' is sad testimony to the effectiveness of our cultural hegemony.
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